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Software and Hardware Based Fault Injection Attacks against the CPU and MCU
 Lörinc, Marek ; Hanáček, Petr (oponent) ; Perešíni, Martin (vedoucí práce)
The thesis deals with attacks that cause faults in CPU and MCU calculations. A short voltage change in CPU or MCU is used to trigger the error. The theoretical part of the thesis deals with the description of how to cause and exploit these errors. This section also describes the most well-known protection against hardware attacks, which is a trusted execution environment (TEE). Inject a fault to TEE is the primary target of fault attacks. The practical part deals with the replication of PlunderVolt and VoltPillager attacks on Intel processors with an activated TEE SGX. Several experiments were performed to trigger faults in RSA and AES encryption within the SGX enclave. To obtain the encryption key from these errors, known analysis methods were used. The practical part also deals with the replication of the attack on ARM microcontrollers with an active TEE TrustZone-M.
Úplný záznam
Software and Hardware Based Fault Injection Attacks against the CPU and MCU
 Lörinc, Marek ; Hanáček, Petr (oponent) ; Perešíni, Martin (vedoucí práce)
The thesis deals with attacks that cause faults in CPU and MCU calculations. A short voltage change in CPU or MCU is used to trigger the error. The theoretical part of the thesis deals with the description of how to cause and exploit these errors. This section also describes the most well-known protection against hardware attacks, which is a trusted execution environment (TEE). Inject a fault to TEE is the primary target of fault attacks. The practical part deals with the replication of PlunderVolt and VoltPillager attacks on Intel processors with an activated TEE SGX. Several experiments were performed to trigger faults in RSA and AES encryption within the SGX enclave. To obtain the encryption key from these errors, known analysis methods were used. The practical part also deals with the replication of the attack on ARM microcontrollers with an active TEE TrustZone-M.
Úplný záznam

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